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Berkeley on Abstraction, Universals and Universal Knowledge 
Tom Stoneham (tom.stoneham@york.ac.uk) 
University of York 
 
In this paper I make three claims.  The first is that, while Berkeley treated the 
metaphysical problem of universals as unproblematically resolved in favour of 
nominalism (which he interpreted in an extreme form Ȃ see Stoneham 2002, 
7.4), he recognised the epistemic problem as a separate issue he needed to 
engage with and that this is the primary positive contribution of his attack on 
abstraction.  The second is that his solution to the epistemic problem is semiotic, 
but his semantics here is anthropocentric and pragmatic (in contrast to the 
semantics of visual language).  This will take up the bulk of the paper.  The third 
is that this semantic theory, while it emphasizes the role of signs and thus has 
some affinities with formalism, has no special role for formal properties of signs 
and in fact makes formalism hard to achieve. 
 
1. The problem of universals ǯ
discussion of abstract ideas in the Introduction to the Principles.  In the published 
version of 1710 this appears largely as an internal debate amongst nominalists 
about how best to account for the meaning of general terms, and in particular, 
whether it is necessary to admit a class of abstract ideas.  In other words, it Ǯǡevery thing which exists, is 
particularǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍken as a premise in his discussion, and a more 
Platonist option is never seriously considered.1   
 
But if the metaphysical question is resolved in this manner, that just makes more 
pressing the epistemic question of universals: if we have universal knowledge, 
                                                        
1 Why Berkeley should feel so confident that nominalism is universally received is not my topic 
here, though it is an interesting question which would need one to investigate the publications 
and reception of the 1675 Oxford University Press edition of OckhǯSumma Logicae, which 
appears to have been one of the few editions since the 15th century.  And there is, of course, ǯǡǮǯǤt is also worth noting that Locke attributed the view that 
everything which exists is particular to Malebranche as well (Examination, 45).  REFER TO 
CHAPTER ON MALEBRANCHE HERE. 
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knowledge which extends beyond our knowledge of particulars, then what is 
that knowledge about?  ǯǡ
it is not a problem of how we get to know universal propositions, but the 
problem of what it is that we know when we do know them.  For the Platonist, to 
know that man is mortal is not to know something about particular men (though 
it entails that each particular man is mortal), but to know something about the 
form of Man, the universal nature of Man.2  But the nominalist must reject this, 
raising the question of what universal knowledge is about.  The young Berkeley 
drew attention to this in the Manuscript Introduction version of PHK Intro 15: 
 
For tho' it be a point much insisted on in the Schools, that all Knowlege is 
about Universals, yet I could never bring my self to comprehend can by no 
means See the necessity of this Doctrine. ǥ It is true one thing for a 
Proposition to be universally true, and another for it to be about 
Universal natures or notions.  
(Belfrage 1987, 26) 
 
But what is it for a proposition to be universally true?  To be true it must be true 
of something or other, and to be universally true it seems that it must be true of 
something universal.  It appears that the abstractionist is offering a 
nominalistically acceptable account of what it is to be universally true, namely 
that it is to be true of abstract ideas.  These are not the widely rejected 
universals, for they are merely the Ǯwork of the mindǯȋǡEssay 2.5.2 and 
passim), but they somehow manage to get us beyond particularity.  If Berkeley 
rejects abstraction, he is faced with a significant  problem of the cognitive 
content of universal claims. 
 
When we consider this question, it is significant that Berkeley takes Locke to be 
his primary antagonist and that he uses a discussion of Locke to introduce the 
topic of generality in the Principles (PHK Introd. 11).  Locke had noticed the 
distinction between merely plural and fully general or universal claims.   
                                                        
2 I hope it is obvious that I am here picking up on the 17th Ǯǯ
species rather than just one sex.  Less controversial examples would be possible, but I want to ǯEssay 3.3.12 (discussed below). 
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The next thing therefore to be considered, is, what kind of signification it 
is, that general words have. For as it is evident, that they do not signify 
barely one particular thing; for then they would not be general terms, but 
proper names; so on the other side it is as evident, they do not signify a 
plurality; for man and men would then signify the same, and the 
distinction of numbers (as the grammarians call them) would be 
superfluous and useless. (Essay, 3.3.12) 
 Ǯthe ǯinvolves plural reference to all the particular men.3 ǮMan is mortalǯǣmerely 
about all the particular men, but about all possible men in virtue of their shared 
humanity.  When we assert that man is mortal, the proposition we assert is not 
just about some collection of men, perhaps all the men we have or will meet, but 
anything whatsoever which is a human.  As Berkeley puts it when giving the ǡǮular right lines ǯȋǤ ? ?ȌǤBut if, as Locke claims, ǮAll things that 
exist being particularsǯ (E 3.3.1), then the nominalist struggles to find a subject 
matter for the proposition: there just are the particular men and nothing else for 
it to be about. 
 
One might think that the most natural thing for an empiricist to say about this is ǮǯǮǯǤ
is drawing our attention to here is in fact independent of trǮǯ
phrase.  For while a 20th Ǯǯ
is equivalent to a huge conjunction of singular propositions, it cannot be the case 
that the content of our knowledge is given by this conjunction.  Nor does the 
model-theoretic approach help, for telling us that it is true if and only if each 
                                                        
3 It is possible that Locke is here ȋǮǯȌDe Interpretatione  ?ǡǮǯǮǯǡǮǯǤǡǯon 
rests some claims about negation (which seem to ignore the possibility that a single sentence can 
have two negations of different scope) and is not really relevant to what Locke is considering.  ǯings into universals and particulars to a 
division of propositions along the ǡǮǯ (Whitaker, 2002, 83).  Thanks to Kenneth Pearce for suggesting the allusion to Aristotle.  
 4 
ǮǯǮǯǣ
think of them by means of plural reference or some other way?  The problem of ǮǯǤǯǮǯǮǯ
made as the contrast beǮǯǮǯǣǡ
knowledge but knowledge about a plurality.  The point Locke is making is really 
one about predication: a predicate is not the same as a plural name for 
everything it applies to.  ǣǮǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ?ȌǤ4  So the epistemic problem 
arises for even the most faithful empiricist who accepts predication. 
 
As we have seen, ǯprovide one solution to this problem, but 
one which Berkeley roundly rejects.  In the ǮManuscript Introductionǯ and PHK 
Introd. 15, Berkeley shows himself to be concerned with what universal 
knowledge is about and that is also one explicit motivation behind ǯ
appeal to abstraction (E 3.3.6).  Much of the importance for Berkeley of his 
alternative to abstract ideas appears to have been Ǯ
error and difficulty in the scienceǯȋPrinciples, title page).  So far, this appears to 
have nothing to do with immaterialism but to be a separate philosophical 
problem. 
 
2. The Role of the Anti-Abstraction Arguments 
However, sǯrejection of abstract ideas 
is primarily there as a crucial premise in his argument for immaterialism.5  
Despite their philosophical inventiveness, these interpretations simply lack 
plausibility when we consider the texts as whole works.  While the rejection of 
abstraction is emphasized, it is not given the structural role we would expect of a 
                                                        
4 This is quoted in Margolis (1982), a rich and subtle paper which, in effect, lays the foundations 
for what follows.  See especially pages 210-12. 
5 The strongest version of this claim is probably Pappas (2000, passim but v. esp. ch.2).  Other 
versions can be found in Atherton (1987, passim), Bolton (1987, passim), Bracken (1974, ch.4), 
Doney (1982, 274), Tipton (1974, 133, 157), and Warnock (1953, 187). 
 5 
major premise.  For example, the Introduction to the Principles is numbered 
separately from the main text, making it clumsy to refer back to it, despite the 
fact that Berkeley uses paragraph numbers for cross-reference both within the 
Introduction and within the main text.  There are four explicit references to the 
Introduction in the main text of the Principles, two generic (PHK 97 and 120) 
where the possibility of the specific abstract ideas of time and unity is being 
rejected and the Introduction is referred to for the general argument against 
abstraction, and two references to specific sections, namely PHK 122 which 
refers to Introd. 19 and PHK 126 which refers to Introd. 25.  The former is to Ǯǯ
of general terms in the Introduction, and the latter to refer the current 
discussion of geometry back to the earlier discussion.  None of these suggest that 
the rejection of abstraction is a premise in the argument for immaterialism, 
though they do suggest it has some role to play in the wider project of removing Ǯ ǯǤ  And again in the Three 
Dialogues the rejection of abstraction is referred to in general terms but the 
argument neither repeated nor even cited. Compare this to the way that the 
theory of vision is treated as an explicit premise in Alciphron IV and the New 
Theory was even reprinted with Alciphron.  The suggestion that Berkeley took 
the arguments of the Introduction to be a crucial premise in the arguments for 
immaterialism just does not fit with how he chose to present and publish the 
material. 
 
Others, myself included (Stoneham, 2005, 154ff), have tried to show that the 
rejection of abstract ideas has this ǯ
thought.  On this interpretation, Berkeley does not take abstraction to be an 
important philosophical error in itself Ȃ after all, it is a form of nominalism Ȃ but 
one which leads some philosophers astray into the thickets of materialism.  By 
rejecting abstraction, Berkeley seeks to remove a crutch which the crippled 
materialist might rely upon. 
 
While the latter interpretation has a fair amount of support in the texts and 
captures something Berkeley definitely wanted to achieve, it also underestimates 
 6 
him as a philosopher.  Both interpretations have a common fault: they treat 
Berkeley as exclusively concerned with the defence of immaterialism.  Of course, ǯǡ
materialism permeate most other philosophersǯ thinking.  He was a sophisticated 
and well-read enough philosopher to know that the solutions to some important 
philosophical problems might be neutral with respect to immaterialism, but that 
does not make the problems any less worthy of his interest and attention.  So, 
even if it had other functions as well, we can legitimately regard his attack on 
abstraction and his attempt to find a nominalistic alternative as a direct answer 
to the epistemic problem of universals.  And treating it like this turns out to ǯǤ 
 
3. The Semiotic6 Solution to the Epistemic Problem ǯǯǡ reconstructing 
his alternative, nominalistic account of the meaning of general terms.  
Unfortunately, this is never systematically laid out, but when we regard it as an 
attempt to solve the epistemic problem of universals, it can be reconstructed 
from various short passages (emphasis mine): 
 
a word becomes general by being made the sign, not of an abstract 
general idea but, of several particular ideas, any one of which it 
indifferently suggests to the mind. (PHK Intro 11) 
 
an idea, which considered in it self is particular, becomes general, by 
being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same 
sort. (PHK Intro 12) 
 
universality, so far as I can comprehend, not consisting in the absolute, 
positive nature or conception of any thing, but in the relation it bears to 
the particulars signified or represented by it: by virtue whereof it is that 
                                                        
6 ǮǯEssay 4.21.4 and I suspect we can ante-date this usage. In contrast, the 
OED has no uses of Ǯǯ ? ?th century.  However, I shall talk of denotation etc. as 
the semantic properties of signs. 
 7 
things, names, or notions, being in their own nature particular, are 
rendered universal. (PHK Intro 15) 
 
there is no such thing as one precise and definite signification annexed to 
any general name, they all signifying indifferently a great number of 
particular ideas. (PHK Intro 18) 
 
Words have semantic properties such as signification, denotation and reference, 
so it is easy to see Berkeley as here primarily concerned to give an alternative to ǯanguage (e.g. Stoneham 2002, 7.3): general terms do not 
denote or signify or represent ideas in the mind of the speaker, rather they 
signify all the particular things of that kind.  They are not names for any or even 
all of those particulars, for they are not names at all, rather their semantic ǮǯǤWhat exactly this 
amounts to, we are not told, but we can reasonably infer that it is not plural 
reference.  Rather it is an entirely different kind of semantic relation.  Locke has a 
view which effectively requires each term to be the name of an idea, and that 
forces him to find ideas for general terms to name, but Berkeley points out, 
perfectly correctly, that general terms just do not function like that. 
 
Furthermore, he expresses the account with verbs oǡǮǯ Ǯǯ.  This makes clear that he sees generality as a phenomenon of 
human language, a phenomenon we actively introduce into a language on top of 
its referential semantics.7 
 
However, treating this as a problem in the philosophy of language8 appears to 
leave unanswered the more fundamental question which was also answered by 
the appeal to abstract ideas: how do we think general thoughts, which are 
                                                        
7 One might think that the next point, about the need for an account of generality in thought, 
arises here, for how can we make a sign general without having the intention to do so, and that 
intention must have a general content.  However, it is an oversimplification to think that all 
semantic intentions are simply intentions to match up signs with pre-existing concepts. 
8 It seems that in the Manuscript Introduction Berkeley did see generality as an entirely linguistic ǡ ? ? ? ?Ǯǯǡal ideas in some 
sense.  See Pitcher (1974, 82-3). 
 8 
presumably what we are trying to express with these general terms?  We can see 
the need for such an account in the rather rhetorical conclusion to the 
Introduction: 
 
And he that knows names do not always stand for ideas, will spare 
himself the labour of looking for ideas, where there are none to be had. It 
were therefore to be wished that every one would use his utmost 
endeavours, to obtain a clear view of the ideas he would consider, 
separating from them all that dress and encumbrance of words which so 
much contribute to blind the judgment and divide the attention.  (PHK 
Intro 24) 
 
The first sentence tells us not to go looking for abstract ideas as the meanings of 
general terms and the second tells us to focus our attention not on words but on 
the ideas we have in mind.  But if all Berkeley had said about universality was to 
give an account of the semantics of general words, then when we discard the 
dress of words, we would be left with nothing but particular ideas in our minds: 
it would seem that there is no space for general thoughts ǯǤ
And yet section 15 seems to confidently assert that he can allow for universal 
knowledge: 
 
It is I know a point much insisted on, that all knowledge and 
demonstration are about universal notions, to which I fully agree: but 
then it doth not appear to me that those notions are formed by 
abstraction in the manner premised; universality, so far as I can 
comprehend, not consisting in the absolute, positive nature or conception 
of any thing, but in the relation it bears to the particulars signified or 
represented by it.  (PHK Intro 15) 
 
If generality were an entirely linguistic phenomenon, and Berkeley thinks that 
we can and should turn our attention from words to the contents of our minds 
when doing philosophy, it would be puzzling how he can be so confident that 
 9 
there is universal knowledge Ǯǯ
particular (for all ideas are particular) ideas adverted to in section 24. 
 
There is, however, no real puzzle because in section 12 he already talks about Ǯǯ, and he immediately follows it with an example of a 
geometric proof.  Thus it seems that he is prepared to attribute semantic 
properties not only to words and diagrams but also to the particular ideas we 
have before the mind.  Crucially, he is prepared to attribute to particular ideas 
the semantic property of indifferently denoting all things of a certain sort.  And 
they acquire this semantic property in the same way that words do, namely by a 
deliberate act of ours ǮǯǤ  The crucial move here 
is to allow that ideas are the sorts of thing that can be signs.9 
 
That particular ideas can signify other ideas is a crucial feature of the New Theory 
of Vision (1709).  That work is primarily addressed to the question of how we see 
depth, that is how do we see objects as being distant from us.  His premise is that 
nothing strictly visible could ever carry information about depth because:  
 
distance being a line directed end-wise to the eye, it projects only one 
point in the fund of the eye, which point remains invariably the same, 
whether the distance be longer or shorter. (NTV 2) 
 
He concludes that distance is only ever immediately perceived by touch, 
however, there are regular, though contingent and arbitrary, connections 
between certain visual appearances and tangible distances.  These contingent 
connections, once learnt, allow us to know that certain visual appearances 
represent distance.  Berkeley thinks that not merely do these visual objects Ȃ 
light, colours, shapes Ȃ possess semantic properties when combined in various 
ways, but also that they meet the other conditions for being a language and that 
we should treat the objects of vision as words in a Language of Nature giving us 
information about the unseen which we need in order to survive (on the claim 
that they literally form a language, see Stoneham 2012).  Because these semantic 
                                                        
9 There is good reason to think this rules out an adverbial account of ideas. 
 10 
properties derive from natural connections which we experience all our lives, we 
do not notice ourselves learning them.  Furthermore, once we have learned 
them, the visual ideas suggest to the mind the ideas they signify without any 
conscious intervention on our part, much like the way we hear the meaning of 
words spoken in a familiar language without noticing the step from sound to 
meaning, and often without even noticing the sounds at all.  Hence we think we 
see distance, for when we see certain visual cues, strictly tangible ideas of 
distance are straightaway presented to the mind, just as if they were part of the 
visual experience.  And in a sense they are: because the objects of visual 
experience Ȃ light, colours shapes Ȃ have semantic properties, they signify other 
ideas, to one who knows those signification relations the visual experience has a 
double object, the sign and what it signifies, in precisely the way our experience 
of human languages has a double object, namely the words and what they signify. 
 ǯextending the range of 
semantic properties possessed by ideas.  In NTV, the semantic properties of 
visual ideas were natural, they were created by the contingent, arbitrary but 
systematic connections between those ideas and ideas of touch (as well as other 
ideas of sight).  The semantic properties of human languages are human 
creations, be they singular or general.  Given the strict parallelism in the 
Introduction between the generality of words and of ideas, one can infer that this 
semantic property of our ideas is also a human creation: it is we who make 
particular ideas stand indifferently for all ideas of the same sort.  Hence the ǮǯǤThus, when thinking ǮMan is mortalǯǡ
before my mind the idea of some particular human, it matters not whom but let 
us say Xanthippe, and I think about humans,10 rather than just Xanthippe, by 
giving that particular idea of Xanthippe the semantic property of standing for all 
humans whatsoever. 
 
                                                        
10 ǮǯǮǯ
impossibly strained when we use an example of a woman.  Which is why it is appropriate that 
that usage should be actively discouraged. 
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ǯǡ
epistemic problem of universals, that it explains the cognitive content of 
universal claims?  If those claims are not about Platonic universals, and they are 
not about pluralities of particulars, and nor are they about abstract ideas, what 
are they about?  The closest Berkeley comes to answering this question directly 
is in a much later work, where he is defending the possibility of belief in the 
Christian mysteries by drawing parallels with scientific knowledge: 
 
If I mistake not, all sciences, so far as they are universal and demonstrable 
by human reason, will be found conversant about signs as their 
immediate object, though these in the application are referred to things. 
(A VII.13; see also DHP1 173, DM 7, A VII.11 for similar passages). 
 Ǥ ? ?Ǯall knowledge and 
demonstration are about universal notionsǯǤSo universal sciences are actually 
about signs Ȃ words, diagrams or particular ideas Ȃ and these are their 
immediate content; but being signs, these objects have signification and thus by 
being about signs the sciences are also about what those signs represent.  A sign 
is not a formal object, but something which essentially has a semantic value.  
Even in the case of arithmetic, where we have the option to study the signs Ǯǡ
whatever particular things men had need to computǯȋ ? ? ?ȌǡǮǯǡǮǯȋ ? ? ?ȌǤ 
 
Which is to say that in all cases of universal knowledge, there are two objects: 
the signs and what they represent or signify.  The former gives no knowledge 
without the latter, but  the latter is, in the case of generality, unthinkable without 
the former.  So that on any given occasion we consider the proposition that man 
is mortal, the immediate cognitive content is a particular idea of a particular 
huǡǡǡǮǯǤǡǡǡǯfamous 
demise.  But if Socrates and his particular death are signs and have been 
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Ǯǯǡǡ
thinking about the particulars I can also think and know the universal 
proposition they represent.  
 ǯthat, unlike 
knowledge of particulars which is concrete and direct, it is essentially semiotic.  
The problem was generated in such a way that we seemed to need a special kind 
of object to be the kind of thing a universal proposition is about, but all such 
objects are found wanting.  Berkeley denies we need a special kind of object and 
instead finds them to be about ordinary objects which have special properties, Ǯǯ Ȃ by us Ȃ 
to represent all things of a particular sort. 
 
This is a striking and original solution to an age-old problem, but one might think 
that all it does is sweep the problem under the carpet.  Surely the problem recurs 
when Berkeley talks of an idea or other sign being made to signify all things Ǯof a 
particular sortǯ (PHK Introd 12).11  For then we should ask what makes it the 
case that two particulars are of the same sort, for example, both are men and 
thus, since we have claimed that man is mortal, that both are mortal.  If the 
reason both are men is that they are each one of the men, where Ǯthe menǯ
to a specific collection of particular men, then it seems that we have failed to 
make a universal claim at all and our general Ǯǯǡ
but for a plurality rather than a singularity.  However, if we say that both are 
men because both have the property of being human, or both partake of 
humanity, then we have appealed to something non-particular, a universal of 
some kind. 
 
It seems that the Platonist and the abstractionist both have accounts of what 
makes several distinct particulars belong to the same sort, what make Socrates, 
Xanthippe and Plato all humans; but, by doing away with anything except the 
particulars themselves, Berkeley appears to leave himself without the possibility 
                                                        
11 This is a familiar criticism of Berkeley on abstraction which can be found in several places, 
including Aaron (1967, 65), Bolton (1987, 65-6) and Pitcher (1977, 89-90). 
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of such an account. When particulars are rendered universal they are given a 
semantic property which determines that they signify some things and not 
others, and this property creates a partition not merely amongst the experienced 
objects, or even the potentially experienced objects, but amongst all objects 
whatsoever.  The possibility of having such a semantic property is precisely the 
philosophical problem we are dealing with, because it is the problem of 
determining the cognitive content of a universal claim. 
 
Berkeley is well-aware that Platonists and abstractions are giving an account of 
what makes several things all of one sort, but  seems to think such an account is 
unnecessary: 
 
From which it must necessarily follow, that one word be made the sign of 
a great number of particular ideas, between which there is some likeness, 
& which are said to be of the same sort. But these sorts are not determin'd 
& set out by Nature, as was thought by most philosophers. Nor yet are 
they limited by any precise, abstract ideas settled in the mind, with the 
general name annexed to them as is the opinion of the author of the Essay, 
nor do they in truth, seem to me to have any precise bounds or limits at 
all. (Jessop & Luce, vol.2, 128)12 
 
However, his optimism that such an account is unnecessary seems unfounded 
and he is left with nothing to say about an important philosophical problem. 
 
Those who feel the force of this objection have underestimated the extent of ǯǤ
universal sciences are in fact signs.  The philosophical theory that mathematics is 
really just about signs and symbols and the rules for manipulating them, known 
as formalism, is a form of anti-realism, so we should be struck by the anti-realist 
                                                        
12 I have here quoted from Jessop & Luce, despite the liberties they take with the text. This is 
because the end of this passage involves much crossings out and re-phrasings and I only want to ǯther than his considered opinion upon it.  The 
published introduction contains even less on the issue, supporting my reading that he takes it to 
be unnecessary to give an account of what makes for sorts of thing.  See Appendix. 
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ǯ (though, as PHK 122 makes clear, he is no 
formalist).  By saying that the immediate object of universal knowledge is the 
signs, Berkeley has moved away from a straightforward realist position which 
holds that the universal proposition that man is mortal is straightforwardly 
about men in general, for it is necessarily about some particular object, be it a 
man or an idea or a word.  Yet those particular objects are also signs which are 
given significance, and significance of a special sort.  Thus mathematics and 
other universal sciences and branches of knowledge are not only about signs, 
just immediately about them.  What those signs signify are concrete particulars.   
 
The objection being raised asks what determines that a given general sign 
indifferently signifies all and only particulars of a given sort, what makes it that ǮǯǤǯ
anti-realist move of claiming that, independently of human activity, specifically 
human representational activity, there are no facts about what sorts of things 
there are.13  It is because we have a sign which signifies indifferently Socrates 
and Xanthippe and Plato and all other humans that they are of the same sort.  
The semantic properties of general signs do not track the sorts of things there 
are in the world, for a thorough-going nominalist no more believes in objective ǤǡǮǯǡ
we make it represent in a certain way, we also create the sameness of sort 
possessed by all humans. 
 
Given that we create these semantic properties, Berkeley not unreasonably 
concludes that they are a function of our natures and interests.  But now a new 
version of the problem occurs, for if the distinction between a human and 
another animal on the baǮǯ
not the latter is a function of our interests and nature, then it is far from obvious 
that the distinction will in fact project determinately over an indefinitely large 
and varied set.  Consider Lucy, the famous australopithecus afarensis whose 
                                                        
13 Of course, there is nothing to prevent God from rendering some sign universal, but then either 
he is doing it by reference to his own interests or ours.  If the latter, then we can grasp the 
signification of the sign, but the sameness of sort is no different from that possessed by signs we 
make general.  If the former, we cannot grasp the signification. 
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complete fossilized skeleton was discovered by Leakey.  Was she human?  Does 
our commitment to the universal claim that humans are mortal include Lucy?  ǡǮǯthers are careful to 
avoid that and only talk of hominins.   Is there a definitive answer as to whether ǡǫǯ
answer appears to be that the answer is relative to our interests in making the 
classification, and ultimately our interests boil down to the Ǯǯȋ ? ? ?Ȍ.  Thus if a question of 
classification is not useful, that is, it has no impact however indirect on human14 
pleasure and pain, then it is arbitrary.  Thus, if we find it useful to treat Lucy as a 
human, then we should; if we find it hinders us, perhaps impeding our 
understanding of ǡǯǢf it seems to be indifferent to us, 
then perhaps there is no determinate answer.  As he put it in the Manuscript 
Introduction (admittedly here thinking exclusively about language): 
 
... nor do they [sorts] in truth, seem to me to have any precise bounds or 
limits at all. For if they had I do not see, how there could be those doubts 
& scruples, about the sorting of particular beings, which are observ'd 
sometimes to have happened. Neither do I think it necessary the kinds or 
species of things should be so very accurately bounded & marked out. 
(Jessop& Luce, vol.2, 128)15 
 ǡǯknowledge may in fact only secure that 
our universal knowledge is humanly universal, that universal propositions apply 
determinately only within the range of actual and possible human experience, 
and even then they will only be as determinate as we have reason to want them 
                                                        
14 Berkeley is quite liberal about which species can feel pleasure and pain, and would thus allow 
that a classification may be non-arbitrary in virtue of its impact on, say, avian or even apian 
pleasure and pain. But we can only make our words general in that way by reference to those 
other species hedonic states, so we would have to know about them and choose to use our terms 
that way. 
15 Again I quote from the inaccurate Jessop & Luce edition rather than the Belfrage diplomatic 
edition, this time because the whole passage is struck through in the manuscript.  While this ǡǯ
considered views, merely his earlier openness to the kind of pragmatist position I am articulating 
here.  See Appendix. 
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to be.16  Since the sameness of sort that we recognise is a human construction, 
ǯȂ 
ǯ Ȃ 
there are no facts of the matter whether two particulars belong to the same sort 
or not (though there will be facts about whether humans take them to so belong, 
a fact which God can make use of).  It follows that, at least 
ǯ
perspective, our universal knowledge is not truly universal.  But if true 
universality is possible, it is only accessible to an infinite being, for only such a 
being could render one of its signs to be truly universal.  Hence, insofar as our 
universal sciences fall short of true universality and only express the humanly 
universal, that does not matter, for there is nothing they are missing which is 
intelligible to us finite beings.  Furthermore, even if there is true universality, 
even if God does render signs universal, that is not absolute or objective 
universality, for it is still relative to His (infinite) interests. 
 ǯǡ
knowledge of particulars which is concrete and direct, it is essentially semiotic 
and indirect.  This is a nominalist solution because the semantic properties of 
our general signs are merely arbitrary connections between particulars which 
are created by finite minds.  But we should admit that Berkeley has not really 
given an adequate solution to the original problem, if we are to take the 
condition of an adequate solution to be one which achieves all that the question 
presupposes an answer would achieve.  For the epistemic problem of universals 
was the problem of how we make claims with universal content, claims which 
extend beyond our knowledge of particulars and are true of an indefinitely large 
number of things with which we may have no acquaintance: how can we make 
claims about all beds or all humans if we, and the people we talk to, have only 
ever come across some finite subset of beds or humans?  ǯ
reveals that our universal claims are not really as universal as the Platonist, and 
                                                        
16 We can, and should, ask whether there is space here for incorrect classification.  The answer 
seems to be that an individual can mistake what the cognitive community has determined the 
most useful classification to be, and a community can mistake which classification best serves its 
interests.  But it seems that the community, though not the individual who is trying to make her 
classification conform to thǯǡǤǡ
point the epistemic problem of universals connects with the sceptical problem about meaning ǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ 
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perhaps the abstractionist, took them to be.  They do extend beyond our 
individual experience and the collective experience of any specific group of us, 
but not indefinitely, for their scope is determined by human interests and those 
are finite.  Were an infinite being to create general signs, they might enable him 
to make fully universal claims, but we could not grasp their signification.  Instead 
we must settle with what is humanly universal. 
 
4. Language and Formalism ǯ views on universal knowledge has 
certain similarities to the account of his views on scientific knowledge given in 
(Peterschmitt 2009).  However, as is so often the case in these matters, the 
differences are more significant than the similarities.  I shall discuss two. 
 
The first significant difference is scholarly.  Peterschmitt suggests that the ǯ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ǯǯǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǡ
413).  The crucial change is that in 1710 Berkeley takes our knowledge to be 
restricted to our ideas, but in 1732 he recognises how the formal character of the 
languages of science allows us to extend our knowledge beyond our ideas.  On 
my view, in contrast, the epistemic problem of universals, which is precisely a 
problem of how our knowledge can extend beyond our particular ideas, had 
been a matter of concern since 1708 and a solution was offered in 1710.  
Admittedly, some parts of the solution are not made fully explicit until Alciphron 
in 1732, but this does not represent a change of view but an addition of 
important detail.  Furthermore, in the discussion of arithmetic at PHK 122, Ǯthings but the signsǯ in recognition of 
its formal (though not formalist Ȃ see above) character, Berkeley explicitly notes 
the connection with ǮǡȋSect. 
19. Introd.ȌǯǤ ȋ ? ? ? ? ? ?ȌǮto me it 
appears that all grammar & every part logic contain little else than rules for 
discourse & ratiocination by wordsǯǤ 
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The more interesting disagreement with Peterschmitt is over the formal 
character of languages which extend our knowledge beyond our ideas.  It is to a 
large extent this emphasis on the formal in Alciphron which makes Peterschmitt 
think there is such a large departure from the PrinciplesǤǮǯǯ are 
really doing much work at all here. 
 
One clear sense in which a language can be formal is that it contains syntactic 
inference rules.  That is, rules which allow one to perform valid inferences 
without knowing the meaning of the terms in question.  Clearly algebra is a 
formal language in this sense, but in fact all natural languages have some formal 
elements.  Any given language can be more or less formally complete, that is its 
syntactic inference rules can allow one to perform a greater or lesser proportion 
of the valid inferences statable in that language.  Mathematics and the artificial 
languages of formal logic tend to have a high degree of completeness Ȃ possibly 
100% - whereas natural languages contain many valid inferences which are not 
captured by syntactic inference rules (famously: if the book is red it is not green). 
 
Now, it seems that any given science is distinctively formal in this sense Ȃ that is, 
is formal compared with non-scientific or vulgar discourse Ȃ exactly to the extent 
it is mathematical in the broad sense which includes mathematical logic.  And it 
may well be true that all sciences are more mathematical than non-scientific 
discourse, but it looks like there is a continuum here, with the vulgar using a fair 
amount of basic geometry and arithmetic, and theoretical physics being almost 
entirely mathematical.  Being formal in this sense certainly enables a language to 
extend our knowledge beyond our immediate ideas and in ways that have 
practical consequences.  A simple example which has nothing to do with physics 
and mechanics is when someone analyses a series of trades on a commodities 
market, working out how to maximize profit, while having no idea at all about 
what is being traded.17  In contrast, sign systems indicating toilets and exits, 
                                                        
17 When applied in scientific areas where we ǯ have ideas, such as Newtonian kinematics 
or atomic physics, there is a question about whether the knowledge generated is knowledge of 
insensible things or merely of the structure of reality.  On this I disagree with Peterschmitt (see 
Stoneham & Cei (2009), Stoneham forthcoming) but that is another issue. 
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while they have a superficial appearance of syntactic rigour, in fact lack any 
useful formal properties. 
 
However, with respect to the epistemic problem of universals Berkeley is 
addressing, it is not the case that the formal character of a language is relevant.  
This is because the crucial point is the non-denotational semantics of the signs, 
not their syntactic properties.  One might think that the claim that the subject 
matter of universal claims is the signs themselves makes them in some sense ǮǯǤǮǯPeterschmitt is 
using to get his result about knowledge extending beyond our ideas: there is 
nothing about signs themselves which entails the existence of syntactic inference 
rules.  And in fact the situation is worse than that.  Syntactic inference rules 
require that syntactically specified terms are unambiguous.  Consider the simple, 
formal, inference: 
 
Fa 
a=b  
------ 
Fb 
 
Setting aside the identity sign, there are here three terms (a, b, F), each of which 
occurs twice.  If the semantic value of the two occurrences of any of those terms 
were different, then the inference would be invalid.  But notice that in natural 
languages, many words, formally defined as sequences of letters, are ambiguous 
and thus they can have occurrences which differ in semantic value (and if the 
form of a spoken word is the sound, things are even worse).  So in fact, no 
formally specified instance of that inference in a natural language is guaranteed 
to be valid.  Consider, for example, 
 
George is a novelist. 
George is Eric. 
------ 
Eric is a novelist. 
 ǮǯȋȌǡǮǯ
conclusion refers to Eric Bloodaxe (making it false), the inference is invalid.  
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Similar problems arise with predicates.  Without semantic knowledge we cannot 
tell whether this is a good inference or a fallacy. 
 
So the more interested we are in formal inferences, the more work we need to do Ǥǯ
exactly the opposite, for it actively encourages radical polysemy by insisting (as 
he has to, given his nominalism) that the signs which possess semantic value are 
particulars (e.gǤǮline which taken absolutely is particular, by being a ǯǢ ? ?, my emphasis), be they marks on paper, ǤǮǯ, and 
in the inference above there are four names and two predicates: to say there are 
two names and one predicate, each with two occurrences, as I did above, is not 
for Berkeley to speak of signs but of what they signify, for it is to type the signs 
by their significations. 
 
Even worse, one particular sign can signify different things on different 
occasions or in different contexts.  This is particularly obvious when the signs 
are ideas: my idea of Peter might be made to signify man in one context and 
animal in another (PHK Intro 16, but most clear at NTV 72-3). 
 
Of course there are plenty of things we can do to make a specific sign system 
more formal, eliminating context sensitivity and polysemy, but these are hard-
won achievements in maths and science, not essential features of sign systems Ǥǡǯǡ
have no essential role at all and semantic knowledge is fundamental.18 
 
 
 
                                                        
18 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Iranian Research Institute in Philosophy, 
the International Berkeley Conference in Zurich, the Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa and the 
Institute for Foreign Philosophy at Peking University.  Audiences at these events provided 
excellent questions and discussion which have helped improve the paper considerably. 
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APPENDIX 
I quoted two consecutive passages from the Jessop & Luce edition of the 
Manuscript Introduction, noting that the actual Manuscript contains many 
strikings and variations that Jessop & Luce simplify.  For completeness, this is the 
diplomatic edition of the same passages, from the bottom of folio 10 and the top 
of folio 11: 
 
 
 
